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In Taiwan, in the early 2010s, the leaders of the Miaoli and Hsinchu dis-tricts and the mayor of Taichung – all three affiliated to the Kuo-mintang (KMT) – drew up a plan for the construction of Hakka tulou
(kejia tulou客家土樓) (1) in each of these areas. Of the three projects, only
the Miaoli plan came to fruition: the tulou known as the Hakka Round-
house (Kejia yuanlou 客家圓樓) was inaugurated on 25 October 2014 in
the town of Houlong 後龍. Officially, the aim of these three initiatives
was the development of tourism through the valuation of “Hakka cul-
ture.” (2)
From the time they were proposed until their realisation or abandonment,
these three projects engendered lively criticism on the part of local resi-
dents, the media, and Taiwanese intellectuals. The fiercest polemic centred
on the Miaoli tulou. (3) In 2010, the building of the Hakka Roundhouse led
to the demolition of two clay structures built by the Hakkas of Taiwan in
the early 1950s: the “eight-trigram kiln” (bagua yao八卦窯) and the “tetrag-
onal kiln” (sifang yao 四方窯). In an interview conducted by Liberty Times
in July 2013, Ho Chuan-kun 何傳坤, a Taiwanese anthropologist from the
National Tsing Hua University, expressed his disapproval of the destruction
of a part of Taiwanese Hakka culture, seeing in it the renunciation of a cul-
ture whose foundations were Taiwanese in favour of an imposed Chinese
culture that was stripped of meaning and memorial value for the local pop-
ulation and the Hakkas of Taiwan:
The value of historic monuments lies in the place where they have
their roots. When the government of the district of Miaoli imitates a
tulou, is it to attract Taiwanese tourists or Chinese tourists? Why
would Chinese tourists come to Taiwan to visit these mountain
fortresses, the tulou? […] If we are not saving the cultural heritage
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1. Tulou, literally “earth buildings,” are a type of architecture unique to southwestern China and were
added to the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2008 (in the cultural assets category). Built on stone
foundations, with a wooden frame and surrounded by a wall made of hard-packed earth, the tulou
– often casually termed “mountain fortresses” on account of their fortified appearance – are often
categorised according to their shape and ground plan: the three most common plans are the
round tulou (yuanlou), the square tulou (fanglou), and the five-phoenix-style tulou (wufenglou).
These buildings are inhabited by the Hakka (Kejia in putonghua) and by the Minnan (also known
as Fulao or Hoklo in Taiwan), two sub-groups of the majority Han nationality living mainly in the
provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. However, the heritage rhetoric disseminated by the Chinese
government contributed to the crystallisation of a tulou-Hakka correlation that assimilated the
tulou into a Hakka cultural and territorial marker, thereby obliterating the involvement of the
Minnan population in the building of these edifices. Although this omission was denounced in
2009 by the Chinese architect and researcher Huang Hanmin, an article in People’s Daily in 2011
maintained that “the tulou is the emblem of Hakka culture” and likewise that “Hakka culture is
the soul of the tulou.” Cf. Huang Hanmin, Fujian tulou: Zhongguo chuantong minju de guibao
(The Fujian tulou: Treasures of Chinese vernacular dwellings), Beijing, Shenghuo dushu xinzhi san-
lianshudian, 2009, p.109; Yan Qunxing and Wu Xunying, “Yongding: ‘rang wenhua wu dong tulou’”
(Yongding: “Culture is alive in the tulou”), Renmin ribao, 2011, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb-
hwb/html/2011-12/02/content_970259.htm (accessed on 15 May 2016). For historiography re-
lating to the tulou and the controversy surrounding the nature of this architecture (function, form,
and official rhetoric) cf. Fiorella Bourgeois, From the Construction of the Collective Imagination
to the Reconfiguration of Identities: The dialectic Relationship between the Institutionalisation
of the Tulou and Local Cultures, Dissertation: EHESS, 2015, 176 pp.
2. In 2013, on the pretext of developing tourism, the government of Hsinchu, a neighbouring district
to Miaoli, officially announced the building of a Tourist Service Centre constructed in the form of a
Hakka tulou. Information on the Hsinchu tulou project is available on the official site of the Hsinchu
municipal department of civil engineering. Cf. Xinzhu xian zhengfu gongwu chu (Civil engineering
department of the Hsinchu district), “Xinzhu xian lüyou fuwu zhongxin kejia tulou xingjian
gongcheng weituo guihua jishu fuwu” (Planning department in charge of the construction work on
the Hakka tulou, Tourist Service Centre for the district of Hsinchu), https://docs.google.com/file/d/
0B7DQmv-1pOToY2VKVTNFSjZTN0E/edit (accessed on 22 November 2016). In 2014, it was the
turn of Hu Chih-chiang, the mayor (KMT) of the municipality of Taichung, to plan the building of a
round tulou in the Hakka quarter of Tungshih, but the project did not come to fruition. Cf. Wu Xianjun,
“Kejia yuan tulou tiyan guan de chuangyi fa xiang: Meixue jingji guandian” (Innovative ideas about
Hakka circular earth building experience museum: perspective of aesthetic economy), website of
the Government of Taichung, 2014, http://www.taichung.gov.tw/public/Attachment/
115030/4122415574630.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2017).
3. Yuan Qing, “Taiwan Miaoli gai Fujian yuan lou bei pi weibei bentu kejia wenhua” (The construction
of a round Fujian tulou in the Miaoli District in Taiwan criticised for being contrary to local Hakka
culture), Guangming wang, 22 July 2013, http://politics.gmw.cn/2013-07/22/content_
8351539.htm (accessed on 26 January 2016).
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The Cyber-reception for Three
Hakka Tulou Construction Projects
in Taiwan
From the Event to a Critique of Representative Democracy
FIORELLA  BOURGEOIS
ABSTRACT: In the early 2010s, under the second mandate of Ma Ying-jeou (KMT), plans to construct three Hakka tulou in western Taiwan arou-
sed considerable discontent amongst a section of the Taiwanese population. Their disapproval manifested itself in the eruption of small-scale de-
monstrations and in the expression of differences of opinion and individual experiences in the cybersphere. As actors, internet users took on
the role of citizen’s watch and people’s judge and revealed, through a critique of the three projects, the failings and tensions present in represen-
tative democracy both in terms of cultural identity and procedural mechanisms, highlighting opposed values of the various social agents. 
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of the Hakka of Taiwan, could it be because we do not have confi-
dence in our own heritage? (4)
On 21 September 2013, the Taiwan Hakka Think Tank (Taiwan Kejia zhiku
台灣客家智庫) organised a press conference to call upon the Head of the
Miaoli district, Liu Cheng-hung 劉政鴻, to “immediately stop the building
of a Chinese Hakka tulou that has no connection with Taiwan,” to broaden
his knowledge of Hakka culture, and to enhance the cultural heritage of
Miaoli District. (5)
Alongside small-scale demonstrations against the destruction of the kilns
and the building of a tulou, (6) the protesters exploited the virtual sphere, a
privileged forum for the “critical sovereignty of opinion,” (7) which was in-
creasingly becoming a zone and a tool for citizen-based surveillance in Tai-
wan. (8) This exercise of citizen activity in a democratic context (evaluation,
judgement, prevention, etc.) is part of the communication society, struc-
tured by social media (Facebook, Wechat, Line, etc.), microblogs (Twitter,
Weibo), Bulletin Board Systems (PTT), and other virtual interfaces that
transmit information and enable dialogue between internet users. (9) These
new online communication platforms have led researchers to investigate
the observations of internet users in order to have a better understanding
of their engagement and of the politico-social dimension. (10)
This article analyses certain online controversies (11) concerning the recep-
tion of the three tulou building projects through a qualitative survey on
new media and through the exchange of comments between internet users
published between July 2013 and July 2015. The aim of studying these com-
ments is to reproduce the social mood of a section of the Taiwanese popu-
lation under the second mandate of President Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 (KMT)
from May 2012 to May 2016, and at the same time to enable researchers
to understand more clearly the censorship role played by internet users,
who are often only partially anonymous, and to consider the dynamics of
the comments and virtual dialogue of internet users. 
Although the question of identity is well and truly present in the online
posts, internet users reveal a varied range of concerns that contribute to a
common dynamic: the creation of an indictment against the government
in power and the elaboration of a common horizon of expectation. Virtually
or physically, the players (militants, internet users, and politicians) mobilise
in the name of certain values to initiate, stop, or change the direction of a
process of reform. This article studies the reception of three tulou construc-
tion projects in Taiwan from the perspective of the processual change that
led to the realisation or abandonment of the project rather than from the
perspective of the result. (12)
Empirical materials, choice of corpus, and
methodology
Most of the online articles on building tulou in the Miaoli and Hsinchu
districts and in the Taichung municipality were published between 2013
and 2015 in the two biggest Taiwanese daily papers, the liberal democratic
Liberty Times (Ziyou shibao 自由時報), in favour of Taiwanese independence,
and Apple Daily (Pingguo ribao 蘋果日報), considered to be a moderate
daily. (13) Five of the articles are followed by Facebook comments (four in
Apple Daily and one in Liberty Times), (14) so a total of 129 Facebook com-
ments were collected. This data base was expanded by 23 Facebook com-
ments posted after an article in the online ETtoday 東森新聞雲, and 15
Facebook comments published on the page of the Taiwanese forum Mesotw
(Taiwan xiaozhan 台灣小站), entitled “Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung
demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou” (Miaoli xian-
zhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan Kejia yao gai Zhongguo tulou 苗栗縣長劉
政鴻拆台灣客家窯蓋中國土樓). Moreover, the survey resulted in the col-
lection of 172 other posts on three articles published on one of the main
Taiwanese platforms, PTT Bulletin Board System (Pititi shiye fang 批踢踢實
業坊), mainly used by students. In all, a sample of 367 comments from in-
ternet users, of variable quality and length, were analysed. It should be
pointed out that the pages of the PTT forum and Mesotw are systematically
linked to Liberty Times and Apple Daily. 
Online, the context is provided by many elements: the subject of the
page on which the comment is posted, its place in a virtual dialogue be-
tween internet users, the social network used to publish the comment, etc.
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4. Su Fanghe and Fu Chaobiao, “Miaoli xianzhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan kejia yao gai Zhongguo
tulou” (Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese
tulou), Liberty Times, 22 July 2013, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/698644 (accessed
on 25 January 2016).
5. Taiwan Kejia zhiku (Taiwan Hakka Think Tank), “‘Jinji de Liu Zhenghong’! Chi Taiwan ren de fang,
gai Zhongguo ren de lou” (“Liu Cheng-hung’s Attack!” Destroy Taiwanese dwellings, put up Chinese
buildings), 21 July 2013, http://taiwanhakkatank.blogspot.fr/2013/07/blog-post_20.html (ac-
cessed on 3 March 2016). Five other articles on the construction of the tulou in Miaoli were pub-
lished on the site of the Taiwan Hakka Think Tank: http://taiwanhakkatank.blogspot.fr/search/label/
台灣客家拒絕山寨圓樓.
6. Huang Yixin, “Zhudong ni jian kejia tulou: minzhong kangyi bai chongtu” (Zhudong plans to build
a Hakka tulou: conflicts emerge following protests from the population), Apple Daily, 1 May 2015,
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20150501/602732/ (accessed on 29
November 2016).
7. Pierre Rosanvallon, La Contre-démocratie. La politique à l’âge de la défiance (Counter-democracy.
Politics in the Age of Defiance), Paris, Éditions du Seuil, p. 171. 
8. The movement of democratisation of Taiwanese society in the 1990s led researchers to rethink
democratic participation in the light of new information and communication technologies (NICTs);
they have raised questions on the virtues and vices of “e-democracy” (wanglu minzhu), “electronic
democracy” (dianzi minzhu) and “teledemocracy” (dianshi minzhu). The expanding role of ICT in
Taiwan led, in October 2012, to the foundation of g0v (the ‘o’ of gov was turned into a ‘0’), lingshi
zhengfu in Chinese. The main objectives of g0v – organised along the lines of a liquid democracy
model and composed of hackers, engineers, information technology designers, journalists, lawyers,
and militants as well as human science researchers such as anthropologists and sociologists – are
transparency of information, decentralisation, and openness, that is to say, open data, open source,
open government, and open cooperation. The community’s numerous projects are all part of civic
tech (civic technologies). Certain g0v “participants” (canyuzhe) are government consultants, others
are civil servants. One such is Audrey Tang, appointed minister without portfolio in charge of
digital affairs in August 2016, and also the hacker Luo Peiqi, who now works for the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare (Weisheng fuli bu).
9. On the leading role of new media in the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan in 2014, cf. Liu Shijun,
Zhengzhi kangyi shijian zhong de meiti chuangxin shiyong yu shijian: yi taiyanghua xueyun wei
li (New Practices and Uses of the Media in Political Protests: The example of the Sunflower Move-
ment), Thesis, National Chengchi University, 2014, 157 pp.
10. Many more Anglophone and Sinophone studies on the comments of internet users exist than
have been published in French. Similarly, quantitative studies are more common than qualitative
studies. Amongst the latter, two articles may be cited by way of example: Wu Hsiao-Mei, “Wang-
shang xingzou: Facebook shiyongzhe zhi daka zhanshu yu dibiao shijian” (Traversing the web:
Check-in tactics and place practice of Facebook users), Xinwen xue yanjiu (Mass communication
research), No. 126, 2016, pp. 93-132; Ching-Ting Liao, “BBS wangzhan de Kejia zuqun rentong
jiangou: yi PTT ‘Hakka Dream’ ban weili” (Constructing the Hakka ethnic identity in BBS: A case
study of “Hakka dream” in the PTT), Zixun shehui yanjiu (Journal of cyber culture and information
society), Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 257-293.
11. The term “controversy” is understood here to be an “‘effervescent moment’ as defined by
Durkheim, or in other words, as an occasion for the social players to question certain hitherto es-
tablished balances of power and beliefs, to redistribute amongst themselves ‘greatness’ and po-
sitions of power, and to invent new organisational systems and techniques that will shape their
future relationships differently.” Cyril Lemieux, “À quoi sert l’analyse des controverses” (What is
the use of analysing controversies?), Mil neuf cent. Revue d’histoire intellectuelle (1900, journal
of intellectual history), No. 25, 2007, p. 192.
12. For the idea of “processual change,” I refer readers to Stéphane Corcuff’s presentation of the
notion at the opening of the workshop entitled “The Ordinary and the Extraodinary in Taiwan.
Political, Social and Economic Change” held at the Academia Sinica on 30 and 31 October 2014.
13. For a historical analysis of the political colours of Liberty Times and Apple Daily, see Hsu Chien-
jung, “Taiwan Identity Media,” in Hsu Chien-jung, The Construction of National Identity in Taiwan’s
Media, 1896-2012, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2014, pp. 156-224.
14. Articles published in China Times were not used, since the site blocks comments by internet users. 
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In the case of the Facebook posts, for example, a survey was conducted on
the profile of the internet user in question in order to understand the place
of the comment in the news thread. Nonetheless, internet users enjoy par-
tial anonymity, which acts as a definite curb to a comprehensive under-
standing of the identity of the internet user as a player in the social
network. Digital identity also depends as much on the virtual platform
(that establishes a normative framework of variable flexibility) as on the
internet user. (15)
A chronological analysis of the posts revealed two broad time spans, each
relating to a specific subject: the comments from 2013 relate mainly to the
question of identity, whilst those from 2014 and 2015 reveal a critique of
the local political system. These two issues should be placed against the
background of a more general consideration of the uncertainties of repre-
sentative democracy in the Taiwanese context. 
(De)legitimising the representation of
identities: Authority figure and political
fiction 
Miaoli District head Liu Cheng-hung announced in a press release in July
2013: 
The construction of the tulou represents the local culture of 65% of
the Miaoli Hakka and should enable us to attract tourists. We hope
that everyone will be able to assimilate the tulou as an integral part
of local culture and benefit from this ancestral wisdom. (16)
This declaration drew numerous comments from both sympathisers
and detractors of Liu Cheng-hung’s position, all raising the same question:
can the tulou embody the Hakkas of Taiwan? Two major fundamental
questions emerged from the analysis of internet users’ comments: is the
culture and identity of the Taiwanese Hakkas distinct from that of the
Chinese Hakkas? Are local officials justified in representing a hypostatised
Hakka community? Over and above previous analyses of the lack of con-
sensus between Chinese culture and Taiwanese identity, these issues may
be understood in the light of the tension between the construction of a
political issue as an abstract political principle relating to a form of to-
tality, or unity (“the People,” “the Hakka ethnic group”), (17) and the liberal
principle whereby each individualised subject has the right to self-deter-
mination. (18) Although a comment is a form of individual expression, its
rhetoric is characterised by reference to collective forms of designation,
synecdoches that use I as an expression of the collective. (19) By using
these collective designations as a screen for the I, the internet user tends
to set himself up as an authority figure, the legitimate spokesperson for
a community. 
Chinese Hakkas vs Taiwanese Hakkas: Aporia of the
essentialisation of an identity dualism
Following an article in Apple Daily published on 21 July 2013, entitled
“Miaoli district is building a small mountain fortress, a ‘Fujian tulou’,” an in-
ternet user with a higher education diploma, Nan Xiang Chu, distinguished
between two Hakka communities (see figure 1):
Is this the culture of the Mainland Hakkas? Or is it the culture of Tai-
wanese Hakkas? Did [the town of] Kaohsiung, and [the districts of]
Miaoli and Hsinchu have this kind of architecture before? Is it right
to destroy the square kiln, the octagonal kiln, and other historic mon-
uments? (20)
Nan Xiang Chu’s questions on the nature of Hakka culture in Taiwan are
similar to those of other internet users who raise the issue of the corre-
spondence between the tulou as an element of representation of Taiwanese
Hakka culture and the origin of the Hakkas, a diaspora community, whose
official history has been structured by several migratory waves in China and
the countries of Southeast Asia. (21)
Certain internet users therefore associate the geographic origin of the
Hakkas with the legitimacy of the tulou in its function as a representation
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15. Kevin F. Steinmetz, “Message Received: Virtual Ethnography in Online Message Boards,” Interna-
tional Journal of Qualitative Methods, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2012, pp. 26-39.
16. Huang Yangming and Yang Yongsheng, “Miaoli xian gai shanzhai ‘Fujian tulou’” (Miaoli District is
building a small fort, “a Fujian tulou”), Apple Daily, 21 July 2013, http://www.appledaily.com.tw/ap-
pledaily/article/headline/20130722/35167340/, (accessed on 15 May 2016).
17. The ethnic Hakka group (kejia zuqun) is one of the “four big Taiwanese ethnic groups.” In 2001,
Chen Shui-bian’s Taiwanese government (2000-2008) institutionalised Hakka identity by founding
the Keweihui, the Hakka Affairs Council. In 2002, the Keweihui established an annual festival, the
Hakka Tung Blossom Festival (Kejia tong hua zhai), and in 2011 inaugurated Hakka National Day
(Quanguo Kejia ri huodong).
18. For an analysis of liberal individualism, cf. Nathalie Maillard, La vulnérabilité: une nouvelle catégorie
morale? (Vulnerability: A new moral category?), Geneva, Labor and Fides, 2011, pp. 54-71.
19. Quoting Jean-Louis Fabiani, Cyril Lemieux notes that in cases of controversy, “it is always a ques-
tion of creating conditions that allow the protagonist to invoke as witness, or even constitute as
a resource, the audience to a debate. This audience may be virtual, represent posterity or the uni-
versal: the presupposition of its existence opens up a space for the disclosure of truth. […] In this
type of conflict, the proviso by which the two adversaries must recognise that each has an equal
right to expose their arguments before the public and to present proof tends to be invested by
the participants in varying degrees.” Cyril Lemieux, “À quoi sert l’analyse des controverses” (What
is the purpose of analysing controversies), op. cit., p. 195.
20. Huang Yangming and Yang Yongsheng, “Miaoli xian gai shanzhai ‘Fujian tulou’” (Miaoli District is
building a small mountain fortress ‘a Fujian tulou’), op. cit.
21. The annexing and management of Taiwan by the Qing Empire between 1684 and 1895 on the
one hand, and the establishment of the KMT on the island in1945 on the other, engendered several
waves of migration from China to Taiwan. As a result, almost 98% of the Taiwanese population is
of Chinese origin. The Minnan and Hakka sub-groups that inhabit the southwestern coastal
provinces of China opposite Taiwan (Fujian and Guangdong) account for most of the Chinese mi-
grants. Along with Mainlanders (waishengren) and Taiwanese Aborigenes (Yuanzhumin), the Min-
nan and Hakkas make up the four major ethnic groups recognised by the Taiwanese government.
The Minnan (70%) and Hakkas (15%) represent 85% of the total population.
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Figure 1 – Facebook comment published by internet user Nan Xiang Chu following an article in the Apple Daily entitled “The Miaoli
District is building a mountain fortress ‘a Fujian tulou’.” Source: Nan Xiang Chu, https://www.facebook.com/q19810115 (accessed on 15 May 2016).
of a homogenous Hakka community whose culture is Chinese. In a com-
ment on Facebook published following the article in Apple Daily, internet
user Jimmy Chen declares that the Hakkas are migrants originating from
the mainland and consequently, this historical fact is enough to legitimise
the construction of a tulou in Miaoli. Similarly, Ma Shan 溤山, a Hakka from
Miaoli who supports the Pan-Blue Coalition (22) and is combating what he
considers Minnan chauvinism in Taiwan, frequently underlines the Taiwanese
Hakkas’ Chinese origin. In a comment dated 21 July 2013, he adds: 
The construction of Hakka tulou in Fujian also bears historic witness
to what the Hakkas have experienced. […] Many Hakka friends au-
tomatically associate the tulou with a Hakka dwelling place. This
does indeed mean that this type of architectural heritage can also
represent Hakka culture. (23)
In the same exchange of comments, Wu Mengru 吳孟儒 uses a sarcastic
sophism in order to discredit the rhetoric on origins that justifies the idea
that Chinese Hakka culture is representative of the Taiwanese Hakkas’ his-
tory: 
If we want to see the heritage of the Hakkas from over the Strait, we
only need to go there; why come to see what the Taiwanese have
done? Should we, since human origins lie in Africa, transform all the
Taiwanese buildings into African buildings? Though all are related to
each other, in the end, all societies, all over the world, develop a local
culture [that is their own] […]. (24)
Nevertheless, although the history of the migration of Hakkas to Taiwan
remains an authoritative argument put forward by many internet users, the
cultural rhetoric that emanates from it is skilfully treated by those who sup-
port Taiwanese self-determination regarding their identity, culture, collective
memory, and history. Those who believe that there is a cultural difference
between a Taiwanese Hakka community and a Mainland Hakka group con-
cede that the Hakkas who immigrated to Taiwan produced a culture that is
all their own since they assimilated part of the native culture. (25) The Taiwan
Hakka Think Tank therefore affirmed that “the construction of a round tulou
goes against the historical process of the Hakkas of Taiwan.” (26) In a Face-
book comment dated 22 July 2013, a student from the National University
of Tainan, Wayne Chen, argues that the ancestors of the Hakkas who immi-
grated to Taiwan never built tulou, so the tulou cannot embody the Tai-
wanese Hakka community. 
Detractors and zealots approach the historical narrative from two distinct,
opposing angles. The first group base their arguments on a retrospective de-
terminist historical path to legitimise the Chinese identity of the Hakkas
invoked by the tulou monument. The second group, on the other hand, in-
voke a prospective determinist historical dynamic by which the historic
force that moves Taiwan inevitably leads to the formation of a Hakka culture
that has Taiwanese foundations. Therefore, those who oppose the tulou con-
struction project condemn the semiotic dimension of the architecture as
part of a politically-imposed narrative that conflicts with a historic process
of self-determination unique to Taiwan. 
From one collective to another: An attack on
Taiwanese sovereignty
In an attempt to discredit the erection of the Miaoli tulou and to reinforce
a feeling of “misrepresentation,” internet user Tsen Wei Lun quotes the in-
troduction to an article in Liberty Times: 
Chen Ban [陳板], ex-president of the Hakka television channel and a
guest professor affiliated with the Department of Architecture Art
Conservation of the National University of the Arts in Taiwan,
strongly criticised Liu Cheng-hung by affirming that he had deceived
the Taiwanese people by creating a meaningless style of architec-
ture. (27)
This extract sees the “people” as a form of collective interiority with its
own character, whose expectations have not been fulfilled. The use of the
topic “Taiwanese people” rather than “Hakka” is more evident in the PTT
comments than in those of Liberty Times and Apple Daily. On 22 July 2013,
an internet user introduced a topic on an article in Liberty Times entitled
“Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to
build a Chinese tulou.” (28) In a series of three comments, internet user Chun-
grew makes no mention of the Hakkas and concentrates his arguments on
the fragile construction of Taiwan as a nation (see figure 2):
Of course this [the destruction of the kilns and building of the tulou]
is inappropriate; this type of procedure will destroy traditional Tai-
wanese culture and damage its history. But if, however, we are con-
vinced that Taiwanese roots are in China, then this sort of thing is
fair and right. A nation without roots is a terribly frightening thing. 
22 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 7 / 2
22. The Pan-Blue Coalition is an alliance between several Taiwanese parties – including the KMT, the
People First Party, the New Party, and the Minkuotang – who support, amongst other things, the
promotion of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. 
23. Huang Yangming and Yang Yongsheng, “Miaoli xian gai shanzhai ‘Fujian tulou’” (Miaoli District is
building a mountain fortress “a Fujian tulou”), op. cit.
24. Ibid.
25. Han Baode, “Wenhua jiaorong haishi wenhua xiaobing” (Cultural mix or cultural joke), Taiwan
Hakka Think Tank, 27 July 2013, http://taiwanhakkatank.blogspot.fr/2013/07/blog-post_27.html
(accessed on 14 December 2016).
26. Ibid.
27. Huang Yangming and Yang Yongsheng, “Miaoli xian gai shanzhai ‘Fujian tulou’” (Miaoli District is
building a mountain fortress “a Fujian tulou”), op. cit.
28. CrashonU (crazy), “Miaoli xianzhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan kejia yao gai Zhongguo tulou”
(Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou),
PTT, 22 July 2013, http://b.bbi.com.tw/Gossiping/1Hx8h-vj.html, (accessed on 6 December 2016).
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Figure 2 – Comment by internet user Chungrew published on the PTT platform. Source: CrashonU (crazy), “Miaoli xianzhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan kejia
yao gai Zhongguo tulou” (Miaoli County Chief, Liu Cheng-hung, demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou), PTT, 22 July 2013, http://b.bbi.com.tw/Gossiping/1Hx8h-vj.html, (ac-
cessed on 6 December 2016).
How should we interpret the effort of internet user Chungrew to ratio-
nalise the situation? In his view, it is above all a question of a conflict over
the interpretation of the “roots of the identity” of the Taiwanese population.
Moreover, he does not hesitate to warn against the risks inherent in the in-
determination of these roots for the “Taiwanese nation.” 
Whether it is a question of the defenders of the tulou or of its opponents,
the question of the balance between the instituted (the Hakkas and sec-
ondly the Taiwanese) and the instituting (the tulou) reveals the tension cre-
ated by the inclusion of the autonomous individual (the internet user) in a
personified affective community (“the Taiwanese” people and “the Hakkas”)
whose substance has been called into question. This conflict seems unsur-
passable in that internet users and the media have not reflected upon the
category of “Hakka” as an institutionalised political entity. Moreover, the
media have not encouraged the rationalisation of the pluralism underlying
this standardising designation. 
The “foreigner,” between exemplariness and
defiance: A critique of inter-Strait cultural exchange
policies 
On 22 July 2013, Liberty Times published an article entitled “Miaoli District
Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese
tulou.” The article reproduces the dialogue between public intellectuals and
members of the government: 
The Miaoli government responded to the unsolicited criticism ex-
pressed by Wu Yi-chen [PDP and Legislative Yuan member] in the pre-
vious day’s paper, which accused the government of putting pressure
on the culture of Taiwanese Hakkas. She [Wu Yi-chen] had not un-
derstood that cultures can be exchanged and combined [ronghe
jiaoliu 融合交流] and do not take account of territorial boundaries.
They cannot be neatly compartmentalised. Although public figures
use this topic as a pretext for satisfying their own objectives, the
government of the district will protest strongly and will not give in. (29)
Although these official statements would seem to maintain a distinction
between the Hakkas of China and the Hakkas of Taiwan, the topic of the
exchange and mixing of cultures annoyed many internet users. In a com-
ment published on 22 July 2013 on the Mesotw platform, internet user Kcm
quoted the above passage and denounced the cultural exchange policies
between China and Taiwan promoted by the Miaoli government as part of
the strengthening of inter-Strait Sino-Taiwanese relations in order to justify
the construction of the tulou:
[In order to foster] cultural exchanges, must we begin by mutilating
our own culture and destroying its heritage? Does the rest of the
world behave like this in order to boost tourism? (30)
The analogy of the foreigner appears again in a comment from Youzi buyi
游子布衣, who says that the United States and Japan do not repress their
history and culture in this way. (31) This comparison is particularly interesting
on account of the history of diplomatic relations between the United States,
Japan, Taiwan, and China. As a result, the two countries mentioned by the
internet user have been elevated to the rank of yardstick, or even of an ex-
ample to be followed in the management of collective memory and na-
tional heritage. Similarly, several internet users use the analogy with a for-
eign country to mock Taiwanese cultural exchange policies and the officials
who apply them. In a PTT comment, Bce says mockingly, “If Egypt wanted
to destroy the pyramids to build a great wall, saying that it would attract
tourists, wouldn’t you find that ridiculous?” (32)
At the same time, certain internet users developed a rhetoric of the
“enemy-foreigner,” using an image of China and the local official in which
“foreign” is used to describe any entity that is not part of the affective com-
munity: 
Is he a Chinese spy? He has come specially to destroy Taiwanese cul-
ture when it should be transmitted! The construction of the tulou
will not turn me into a Mainland Hakka, will it? Could it be that in
becoming an official, one becomes an idiot? (33)
In this comment, internet user Chen Hongling 陳虹翎, an interior architect
living in Kaohsiung and who previously lived in Miaoli, does not hesitate to
question Liu Cheng-hung’s relationship with China and call his competency
into question. Similarly, internet user Zeng Huimei 曾惠美, an inhabitant of
the district of Changhua 彰化縣 and supporter of the Pan-Green Coalition,
disapproves of the Taichung tulou project in the Hakka district of Tungshih
東勢區, calling it a “circular Chinese dream of Hu Chih-chiang [胡志強],”
mayor of Taichung and affiliated with the KMT. The expression “Chinese
dream” (Zhongguo meng中國夢) used by the internet user is a direct ref-
erence to the political slogan of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Com-
munist Party of China and President of the People’s Republic of China since
2013, for whom “the Chinese dream” is the dream of the Chinese nation,
but also that of every Chinese person. (34)
So over and above the debate on the politicised representation of Hakka
and Taiwanese identities, the indictment made up of the comments of in-
ternet users targets heritage management in Taiwan by local officials. 
Revealing wrongs: Vices and virtues of the
government 
Whilst the comments from 2013 are mainly focused on questions of iden-
tity, those from 2014 and 2015 reveal new concerns linked to three major
events. On the one hand, the precursor of the Miaoli tulou project is seen
as a failure by the media and the majority of the inhabitants of Miaoli,
Hsinchu, and Taichung. Indeed, the Miaoli tulou, inaugurated in October
2014, contributed to an increase in the budget deficit of Miaoli District, al-
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ready deep in debt. The low level of attendance for the site did not succeed
in boosting tourism in the region. The media added it ipso facto to the long
list of “Mosquito halls” (white elephant buildings) (wenzi guan 蚊子館) in
Miaoli, just like the Ma village (Mafen guan 媽奮館 or Majia zhuang
馬家庄) (35) and Yingtsai Academy (Yingcai shuyuan 英才書院). (36) On the
other hand, the comments published between June 2014 and July 2015
must be analysed in the light of a socio-political context punctuated by nu-
merous demonstrations that resulted in, amongst others, the Sunflower
Movement (18 March - 10 April 2014), (37) a time of civil disobedience and
delegitimisation of the then central government that marked a weakening
of the presidential function as well as a loss of authority for the KMT. Lastly,
the local general election on 29 November 2014 led to the victory of the
DPP in most municipalities, districts, and towns. Six localities, however, re-
mained under the domination of the KMT, including the districts of Miaoli
and Hsinchu. (38)
Against this background of upheaval in which internet users denounced
the wrongs of the system of representation, certain comments opened up
a horizon of expectation and formulated the prerequisites for the establish-
ment of a fair and moral government attentive to the demands of the pop-
ulation and which would be unable to govern without its consent. 
An act of accusation against local officials:
Personifying corruption 
The internet users took on a censorship role towards the officials they
were assessing. As judges, they condemned the acts of these politicians if
they did not measure up to an implicit moral and politico-judicial ethic. Liu
Cheng-hung, for example, was accused of land speculation. On the Mesotw
forum, the internet user NorthStar protested: 
Liu Cheng-hung is the biggest bandit in Miaoli. He has taken the peo-
ple’s land by force and destroyed their heritage. He connives with
the entrepreneurs who speculate on building land […]. (39)
For Chen Dongfu 陳東甫, Liu’s aim was to increase land prices in order to
gentrify the district in which he lived: 
First, Liu Cheng-hung built, next to his home, a high-speed train sta-
tion. Then he had a bilingual school built. The land next to his home
was originally agricultural land. Suddenly, land prices increased and
now he is building a tulou there. He is continually developing the
place […]. (40)
Land speculation incited certain internet users to play on the Chinese
character tu土 meaning here “the earth, the ground, the dust,” coupling it
with other Chinese characters to create insults. Liu Cheng-hung is called a
tufei 土匪, meaning “bandit,” from tu bawang 土霸王, a term meaning a
“land despot,” and tu huangdi 土皇帝, an expression that might be trans-
lated as “land emperor” (see figure 3):
Liu Cheng-hung is “dust,” he has become land emperor in Miaoli, isn’t
it wonderful? The magazines have elected him “chief of the five-star
district.” Building an “edifice of earth” for “the land emperor” is the next
criteria for becoming chief of a five-star district. (41)
Jay Fang, a young man of 35 living in Taipei, called into question the rel-
ative credibility of the system for rating districts. Indeed, in 2012, Liu
Cheng-hung was designated chief of a five-star district following a “poll
measuring the level of satisfaction [of the population] with the officials
at the head of the districts and municipalities” (xianshizhang shizheng
manyi du da diaocha 縣市長施政滿意度大調查), published annually by
the magazine Yuanjian (遠見雜誌). The nomination of Liu was interpreted
as an act of complicity between the Miaoli district chief and the media.
In his exchange with Jay Fang, Lin Zuguang 林祖光, a young Taiwanese
from Kaohsiung and supporter of the Black Island Nation Youth Front
(Heise daoguo qingnian zhenxian 黑色島國青年陣線), added, “925,000
NT$ to buy the magazines and get yourself elected chief of a five-star
district.” (42) Comments, as a form of protest, and more generally, those in
the virtual sphere, have come to compensate for a lack of surveillance in-
stitutions and consequently, a failing of the democratic government to
24 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 7 / 2
35. Miaoli xian zhengfu wenhua canguang ju (Miaoli District Bureau of Culture and Toursim), “Majia
zhuang” (The Ma Village), 20 December 2012, http://www.miaolitravel.net/MainWeb/
article.aspx?Lang=1&Sno=04004484 (accessed on 9 March 2016); Mo Yan-chih, “Ma visits Ma
Village, stresses Hakka roots,” Taipei Times, 25 January 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
front/archives/2012/01/25/2003523976 (accessed on 10 March 2016).
36. Aaron Wytze Wilson, “Miaoli: The district that debt built,” Taipei Times, 12 October 2015,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2015/10/12/2003629837 (accessed on 12 De-
cember 2016).
37. At the start of the Sunflower Movement, the students demanded the cessation of all trade nego-
tiations with China and transparency of information relating to the Trade Agreement on services
between the two shores. 
38. The local elections on 29 November 2014 consisted of nine ballots and a consultation. At stake
in these elections was “the renewal of 11,130 mandates: that of the mayors of the special mu-
nicipalities and towns […], country magistrates […], municipal and county councillors[…], mayors
[…], village and district chiefs […], and the mandates of native district chiefs and their councillors
[…].” Cf. Frank Muyard, “Voting Shift in the November 2014 Local Elections in Taiwan: Strong re-
buke to Ma Ying-jeou's government and policies and landslide victory for the DPP,” China Per-
spectives, 2015/1, p. 55.
39. Comment by NorthStar, Taiwan xiaozhan, 22 July 2013, http://www.mesotw.com/bbs/
viewthread.php?tid=31916 (accessed on 10 March 2016).
40. Su Fanghe and Fu Chaobiao, “Miaoli xianzhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan kejia yao gai Zhongguo
tulou (Miaoli District Chief Cheng-hung is destroying Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese
tulou), op. cit.
41. Huang Yangming and Yang Yongsheng, “Miaoli xian gai shanzhai ‘Fujian tulou’” (Miaoli District is
building a mountain fortress “a Fujian tulou”), op. cit.
42. Ibid.
Special feature
Figure 3 – Facebook comment by internet user Jay Fang posted following an article in the Apple Daily entitled “The Miaoli District is
building a mountain fortress ‘a Fujian tulou’.” Source: Jay Fang, https://www.facebook.com/fangjay2011/posts/10201393521621035 (accessed on 15 May 2016).
regulate itself. Therefore, for internet user Chen Hongmou 陳弘謀, if the
government is not competent in the exercise of the power bestowed on
it, it is up to the sovereign people to make themselves known and defend
their rights. (43)
The role of the internet user-censors was to reveal abuses in a the system.
They associated the demolition of the Hakka kilns in Miaoli in 2013 and
the mobilisation solicited by the forced buying by the state of land belong-
ing to the peasant farmers of Zhudong in 2015 for the construction of a
tulou, with the destruction set in motion by Liu Cheng-hung. Many internet
users reminded their readers that since 2010, Liu had been behind a wave
of expulsions and the demolition of homes that had led to several suicides
in the village of Dabu 大埔, in the district of Miaoli. Subsequently, the pop-
ulation of the district organised several demonstrations in order to de-
nounce the expropriation of land by the local government. For example, the
demands of the big protest movement of 18 August 2013, whose slogan
was “Today Dabu has been demolished, tomorrow the government will be
destroyed” (Jintian chai Dabu, mingtian chai zhengfu 今天拆大埔, 明天拆政
府), included the revision of the Law on the Expropriation of Land (Tudi zhi
shou tiaoli 土地徵收條例). In response to these injustices, several internet
users took part in a virtual collective movement that transmitted a form of
vengeance that expressed itself in the – virtual – destruction of Liu Cheng-
hung’s house. In reaction of the demolition of four homes in Dabu in 2013,
internet user Kuso posted on Facebook a photograph in which he staged
the destruction of Liu Cheng-hung’s house with the help of an animated
miniature mechanical digger (see figure 4). (44) At the same time, several in-
ternet users suggested destroying Liu Cheng-hung’s home and replacing it
with a famous monument. In a comment dated 22 July 2013, internet user
Lin Damao 林大毛 suggested: 
[…] Why not simply destroy the Chief of Miaoli’s house and build a
Statue of Liberty? I think that’s not a bad idea. (45)
A majority of internet users would have liked to see Liu Cheng-hung resign,
citing the lack of possible remedies in the face of his prevarications. On the
one hand, some accused Liu Cheng-hung of being protected by the govern-
ment of Ma Ying-jeou (46) and in particular by the Legislative Yuan. (47) On
the other hand, the comments remind us that this corrupt politician was
elected by the ballot box. As a result, Taiwanese internet users who are not
from Miaoli District incriminated the local inhabitants who gave him pro-
cedural legitimacy through the local elections just as much as they blamed
Liu Cheng-hung himself. 
From local elections to the democracy of
authorisation 
The internet users displayed real disenchantment with an electoral system
that no longer legitimises elected officials. Although the election attributes
a function to an individual, the authority this confers is only partial in that
the governees test the officials during the exercise of their mandate. Al-
though local officials such as Liu Cheng-hung in Miaoli and Chiu Ching-chun
in Hsinchu obtained procedural legitimacy through the elections (also called
“legitimacy of establishment”), (48) they did not acquire the social legitimacy
granted by those they governed. Indeed, the relationship of trust between
the governing and the governed is established in the course of the mandate
and not through the electoral procedure:
How dare you! The Hakkas of Taiwan have never lived in a tulou....
[…] Can someone tell me where the value and meaning of all that
is?? If that isn’t liquidating the budget, what is? Don’t lie to me, there
are no talented men [rencai 人才] in Hsinchu. Just how competent
[gaodu高度] are our leaders? In which direction is the region devel-
oping? I implore these incompetent leaders [mei gaodu de ren沒高
度的人] not to stand for election again […]. (49)
In this comment, Alan Hsieh underlines the lack of perspective in the bud-
getary policies applied in Hsinchu, which he associates with the incompetence
of the local officials in administrative matters. As a result, the electoral pro-
cedure does not allow “men of talent” and experts to be chosen. Concern over
the management of expenses by the local executive branch is frequent in the
comments of internet users. The deficit in Miaoli District, an example not to
be repeated, is used as an authoritative argument by internet users to ratio-
nalise their corresponding rejection of the Hsinchu and Taichung projects.
The internet users expressed their anxiety over the local general elections
in November 2014; some of them evoked the possibility of a KMT victory
in their locality and thought that the tulou construction projects in Hsinchu
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Figure 4 – Mock demolition of Liu Cheng-hung’s home by
internet user Kuso. Source: Lin Xihan and Fu Chaobiao, “Wangyou Kuso jiewei
chichu Liu Zhenghong laojia (Internet user Kuso creates a trompe l’œil and demolishes
Cheng-hung’s home)”, Liberty Times, 22 July 2013,
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/698668 (accessed on 10 January 2017).
and Taichung were a means for the KMT candidates already in office to rally
the Hakka electorate, which is well represented in these regions. (50) More-
over, many internet users questioned the reasons that incited the inhabi-
tants of Miaoli to give free rein to Liu Cheng-hung, this “local tyrant” (tuhao
土豪), (51) this thug (liumang流氓) (52) who “tramples on the people.” (53) In-
deed, although the civil servant Liu has a supporting social role, the choice
of a representative is the responsibility of the citizens of Miaoli. Huang
Zhengyu 黃正羽 expressed the shame Liu Cheng-hung caused him and
other inhabitants of Miaoli:
When I see the King of Miaoli [Liu Cheng-hung], I don’t dare say that’s
where I come from. As they say, it’s the choice of the Miaoli elec-
torate. We have to accept all their choices. In any case, on the day of
the elections, everyone will swallow their tears and vote for the
shadow state party [KMT]. This is Taiwan EJ4. (54)
What does this prophetic fatalism mean, and on what implicit argument
is it based? Does it amount to recognition of the importance of the role of
the local factions in Miaoli, the majority of whose electoral candidates are
affiliated with the KMT? (55)
The construction of a horizon of expectation at the
heart of a crisis of representative democracy
In this context, qualified by Frank Muyard as “political autism,” (56) internet
users, who are not simply critical spectators of a negative policy, are partici-
pating in a reflexive dynamic of wrongs that they heap upon the local leaders.
The comments open up a horizon of expectation resulting in a process, initi-
ated by internet users, of giving meaning to the polemical events linked to
three tulou construction projects. To create this prospective horizon, the in-
ternet users offer alternative solutions to the bad management of budgetary
expenditure. For internet user Jeffrey Bai, the sum invested in the building of
the Hsinchu tulou could have been used to finance the army for several
years. (57) In another commentary dated 17 July 2015, Frank Tien exclaims: 
It’s not enough that the neighbouring district already has one great
“earthen” white elephant, but they have to go and build another
“earth” building! Is it part of Zhudong’s history? If there really is land
available for building and a budget, why not build some social facil-
ities for the people of the district? (58)
Many internet users were demanding more effective management of local
expenditure. Moreover, they sought the application of fairer policies founded
on a consensus between elected officials and the populace that contributed
to the common good. Internet user Lai Mengling 賴孟玲, young and with a
higher education diploma, advised the government to “give the inhabitants
of Taichung the future they deserve and to which they aspire” and suggested
reinforcing Taiwanese soft power. (59) Internet user Gi Chang suggested using
the money allotted to the Miaoli project for the protection of the historic
and cultural Hakka heritage already present in Taiwan. (60)
Conclusion
Over and above the particular nature of the events analysed, the com-
ments seem firstly to shed light on the uncertainties inherent in representa-
tive democracy both from the point of view of identity (conflicts in the col-
lective memory and recognition of pluralism in the formation of a national
identity) and in its procedural mechanisms (representativeness of the policies
and whether the elected officials are competent to govern). Most of the
comments question the quality of this representativeness and at the same
time, its legitimacy. These fundamental problems are discussed through a
certain number of issues such as the dual identity of the Hakkas of China
and the Hakkas of Taiwan, the right to self-determination of national identity,
the corruption of local elected officials, and the disfunctions of the electoral
system at local level. Against this background of democratic uncertainty, the
virtual sphere, a public arena where individual opinions are debated and
where “social worlds” (61) confront each other, affords communities the op-
portunity to participate in the formation and strengthening of a common
framework through which to understand the event under scrutiny. 
Through this reflexive, collective undertaking, the event is not only seen
as a unique occurrence or as the epiphanic symptom of the social machine;
the controversies brought to life by the comments of internet users also re-
veal the existence of value conflicts between several players attempting to
influence the direction of the current process of reform. 
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